Duration: 1 Hour
▼ Integration Checkpoint: Model + Software merged and validated on target ▼
| Aspect | Waterfall | V-Model | Agile | MLOps-Hybrid |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Handles changing requirements | Poor | Poor | Good | Good |
| Handles data-driven uncertainty | Poor | Moderate | Moderate | Strong |
| Traceability / certification fit | Strong | Strong | Weak | Moderate |
| Suited to safety-critical embedded AI | Rare use | Common (adapted) | Rare alone | Common (with V overlay) |
| Manages data/model lifecycle | No | No | Partial | Yes |
Duration: 1 Hour
| Standard | Domain | Key AI-Relevant Aspect |
|---|---|---|
| ISO 26262 | Automotive | ASIL levels, hardware metrics, safety lifecycle |
| IEC 61508 | General industrial | SIL levels, systematic capability |
| IEC 62304 | Medical software | Software safety classes, risk management |
| DO-178C | Avionics | DAL levels, with ED-324 AI supplement |
| ID | Requirement | Type |
|---|---|---|
| FR-01 | System shall detect human presence in frame within 200ms of trigger | Functional |
| NFR-01 | Inference shall consume ≤15mA average current on MCU X | Non-Functional |
| NFR-02 | Model binary shall fit within 256KB flash | Non-Functional |
| DR-01 | Training data shall include ≥30% low-light/night images | Data |
| MR-01 | False negative rate for adult humans shall be ≤2% at 95% CI | Model Perf. |
| SR-01 | On sensor fault, system shall default to "assume presence" (fail-safe) | Safety |
Duration: 1 Hour
| Compute Target | Example | Model Constraints | Typical Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| MCU-class | Cortex-M4/M7 | Models in KBs, integer-only ops | TinyML, keyword spotting |
| MCU + NPU/DSP | Ethos-U, Hexagon | Larger models, quantized INT8 | Visual wake word, anomaly detection |
| SoC with GPU/NPU | Jetson-class | Larger CNNs/transformers feasible | Object detection, multi-modal |
| Technique | Model Size | Accuracy (mAP) | Inference Latency |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baseline (FP32) | 4.2 MB | 78.3% | 85 ms |
| + INT8 PTQ | 1.1 MB | 77.1% | 32 ms |
| + INT8 QAT | 1.1 MB | 77.9% | 31 ms |
| + Structured Pruning + QAT | 0.6 MB | 76.5% | 18 ms |
| + Knowledge Distillation | 0.5 MB | 77.2% | 15 ms |
Example values for object detection on ARM Cortex-M7 @ 400MHz. Always validate on actual target hardware.
Duration: 1 Hour
| Test Type | Purpose | Key Metric |
|---|---|---|
| Regression | New model ≥ old model on full benchmark | Accuracy delta ≥ 0 |
| Robustness | Noise, occlusion, lighting shifts, adversarial | Degradation bounds |
| Edge case / OOD | Inputs outside training distribution | Fallback trigger rate |
| Latency & Resource | WCET for inference, not just average | P99 latency, peak RAM |
| Bias / Fairness | Performance across subgroups | Max performance gap |
"Was the model built right?"
"Was the right model built?"
Duration: 1 Hour
Each case: Context → What Went Wrong → Root Cause → Lesson
A self-driving test vehicle operating in autonomous mode struck and killed a pedestrian crossing outside a crosswalk at night.
The perception system detected the pedestrian but repeatedly reclassified the object type, resetting its predicted trajectory each time. Emergency braking was disabled in autonomous mode, and the safety driver was not attentive.
Classification system not designed to handle jaywalking pedestrians reliably. Disabled automatic emergency braking during testing. Inadequate human-oversight design.
Safety-critical embedded AI needs an independent, simpler safety layer (e.g., classical collision-avoidance braking) that operates regardless of the primary model's classification confidence or consistency.
A flight control augmentation system used a single angle-of-attack sensor to trigger automatic nose-down trim commands.
A faulty sensor reading caused repeated, aggressive automatic trim inputs that pilots struggled to counteract, contributing to two fatal accidents.
Reliance on a single sensor input without redundancy or plausibility cross-checks. Insufficient disclosure and training on the system's authority.
Embedded systems with autonomous actuation of critical controls require sensor redundancy, cross-validation, and clear override/fallback authority for human operators.
A commercial AI system was deployed to recommend cancer treatment plans, trained substantially on synthetic and limited real patient data.
The system recommended treatments misaligned with clinical guidelines in various real-world cases and failed to generalize beyond its narrow training distribution.
Insufficient representative training/validation data. Performance claims not adequately validated against independent, real-world outcomes before deployment.
Model validation must specify representativeness of the deployment population. Performance claims should be independently verified before high-stakes deployment — not accepted from vendor benchmarks alone.
Always-listening embedded voice assistants use a low-power wake-word detector to trigger cloud-based full processing.
Wake-word detectors occasionally misfired on unrelated speech, causing unintended audio capture and transmission to the cloud.
Models tuned primarily for recall (avoid missing activations) with insufficient attention to false-positive rate under diverse acoustic conditions.
Requirements must balance false-positive vs. false-negative costs based on privacy and trust impact. Sensitive data should be filtered/minimized as close to the sensor as possible.
An embedded vibration-analysis model deployed on factory equipment to predict failures.
Accuracy degraded silently over months as machinery wear patterns and ambient conditions shifted from the training distribution.
No on-device or fleet-level drift monitoring. Retraining cadence not tied to any measured performance signal.
Embedded AI needs lightweight on-device drift/confidence monitoring and defined retraining triggers — silence is not evidence of continued correctness.
| Theme | Cases Illustrating It |
|---|---|
| Single point of sensor/model failure without redundancy | Flight control, autonomous vehicle |
| Insufficient representative training/validation data | Clinical AI, predictive maintenance |
| Missing independent safety fallback layer | Autonomous vehicle, flight control |
| Wrong optimization target (recall vs. precision, benchmark vs. real-world) | Voice assistant, clinical AI |
| No field monitoring for drift/degradation | Predictive maintenance |
Overlay MLOps onto V-Model/Agile; manage code, data, and model as parallel first-class tracks
Specify data, statistical performance, and safety fallback behavior explicitly
Co-design model and hardware together; optimize and validate post-transformation
Layer classical (HIL, WCET) with ML-specific (regression, robustness, OOD, fairness) and continuous field monitoring
Consistently trace to skipped redundancy, unrepresentative data, missing fallback logic, or absent drift monitoring
Questions & Discussion
Section 7 — Embedded System Development Process for AI Systems